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DOES IMMUNITY MEAN IMPUNITY? 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE 
OF HOUSEHOLD WORKERS AGAINST 
TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION BY 
THEIR FOREIGN DIPLOMAT 
EMPLOYERS  
“To some, human trafficking may seem like a problem limited 
to other parts of the world. In fact, it occurs in every country, 
including the United States, and we have a responsibility to 
fight it just as others do.”1  
Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton 
INTRODUCTION 
Before Badar Al-Awadi, the Third Secretary at the Kuwait 
Mission, departed for the United States, he promised Vishranthamma 
Swarna a $2,000 monthly salary, Sundays off, and one month of paid 
vacation per year to visit her family in India, in exchange for working 
as a live-in household servant in his New York City residence.
2
 
However, upon her arrival, Al-Awadi confiscated Ms. Swarna‘s visa 
and passport. In clear violation of the employment contract, he forced 
her to work seventeen hours a day, seven days a week, paid her $200 
to $300 per month, and refused to let her take off Sundays to go to 
church or the month to visit her family in India.
3
 The Third Secretary 
                                                                                                                 
1 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, 1 (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2009/ 
126573.htm 
2 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 622 F.3d 123 (2d. Cir. 2010).  
3 Id. at 513. 
 12/30/2010 9:04:35 PM 
270 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
also forbade Ms. Swarna from leaving the apartment unsupervised, 
intercepted her mail and telephone calls from her family, and 
prohibited her from mailing letters home or making telephone calls.
4
 
Al-Awadi abused her almost daily, threatening to cut out her tongue, 
throwing a packed suitcase at her, calling her ―dog‖ and ―donkey,‖ 
and dragging and locking her outside the apartment while taunting her 
with warnings of further injury and/or arrest. The Third Secretary 
raped her on numerous occasions and threatened to kill her if she ever 
told anyone.
5
 As a result of this horrible treatment, Swarna suffered 




One day, Swarna asked to return to India instead of going with the 
family on their trip to Kuwait. In response, Al-Awadi threatened to hit 
her with an iron rod. When she screamed and warned that she would 
call the police, Al-Awadi angrily replied that his brother and father 
were ―high ranking police officials in Kuwait‖ and that ―once [they 
returned to] Kuwait they would ‗punish‘ her.‖7 The following day, 
while both Al-Awadi and his wife were out, she fled the apartment 
and signaled to the first taxi she saw to ask for help.
8
  
Swarna‘s story is only a glimpse into the countless incidents of 
trafficking and abuse of household workers by their foreign-diplomat 
employers who are officially located in the United States. In July 
2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) submitted a 
report to the Senate‘s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law 
describing the alleged abuse of domestic workers by foreign 
diplomats and urging the government to strengthen its efforts to 
address this problem.
9
 The GAO determined that between 2000 and 
2008, a minimum of forty-two domestic workers brought to the U.S. 




 visa and employed by foreign diplomats 
                                                                                                                 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 513–14.  
6 Id. at 514.  
7 Complaint at 14, Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 
Civ. 4880).  
8 Id. at 14–15. For a discussion of the court‘s reasoning and holding in Swarna, see infra 
notes 112–38 and accompanying text.  
9 U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-892, U.S. GOV‘T‘S EFFORTS TO 
ADDRESS THE ALLEGED ABUSE OF HOUSEHOLD WORKERS BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WITH 
IMMUNITY COULD BE STRENGTHENED (2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08892. 
pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A) (2006) (noting that A-3 visas are available to 
―attendants, servants, [and] personal employees [. . . of] an ambassador, public minister, or 
career diplomatic or consular officer who has been accredited by a foreign government, 
recognized de jure by the United States.‖); Temporary Visitors to the U.S.: Diplomats and 
Foreign Government Officials, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/ 
types_2637.html#.  
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alleged that their diplomat employers abused them.
12
 The GAO 
cautioned that the actual number of incidents was likely greater,
13
 
though the director of the GAO‘s section of international affairs and 
trade stated, ―[n]obody expected a number this big.‖14  
Both the U.S. and the United Nations (U.N.) recognize that the 
involuntary servitude of domestic workers falls within the definition 
of trafficking in persons. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000
15
 defines ―severe forms of trafficking in 
persons‖ as ―the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or 
obtaining a person for labor or services through the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary 
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.‖16 Similarly, the U.N. 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons
17
 
states that trafficking includes ―forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery [. . . and] servitude‖ and can be instigated 
by means ―of coercion . . . of deception, of the abuse of power or of 
[. . . placing the person in] a position of vulnerability . . . for the 
purpose of exploitation.‖18 
Currently, foreign diplomats are able to traffic domestic servants 
inside their diplomatic residences in the United States with little to no 
legal repercussions because of the almost absolute immunity granted 
to diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(VCDR).
19
 Without any consequences, there is no incentive for 
diplomats to stop engaging in this form of modern slavery. Because 
diplomatic immunity is adamantly prized and guarded by all parties to 
                                                                                                                 
 
11 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G) (2006) (G-5 visas are available to ―attendants, servants, 
and personal employees‖ of individuals who are permanent mission members of a recognized 
government to a designated international organization and representatives of governments who 
are attending meetings of a designated international organizations.); U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 
supra note 10. 
12 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 3. 
13 Id. at 13–16 (explaining that the victims‘ fear of being deported and of law 
enforcement, the inability to leave the residence, the refusal to identify themselves or their 
diplomat employers in addition to the government‘s policy of not disclosing details of criminal 
investigations, and the lack of an effective way of searching across the various agencies‘ 
databases make it very likely that the actual number of cases is greater than the forty-two 
reported incidents).  
14 Sarah Fitzpatrick, Diplomatic Immunity Leaves Abused Workers in the Shadows, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2009, at A4.  
15 Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C). 
16 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)(B) (2006). 
17 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001). 
18 Id. at art. 3(a).  
19 Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]. 
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the VCDR, States typically resist any attempts to whittle away these 
protections for their own diplomats. While some victims are able to 
obtain a measure of legal redress by waiting to bring suit against their 
diplomat employers until after the diplomat‘s term in the U.S. ends 
(or by wrangling an occasional settlement), these remedies are often 
limited and difficult to obtain. Therefore, a more comprehensive 
approach involving various institutional solutions, such as improving 
internal procedures at embassies, consulates, and international 
organizations, in conjunction with using tools already present in the 
VCDR, such as bringing suit under residual immunity and expanding 
the use of persona non grata, may be the most productive and 
successful way to alleviate the problem.  
This Note breaks down the overarching problem of human 
trafficking inside diplomatic residences into three main topics and 
offers solutions specific to the issues within these areas. Part I 
provides an overview of the origins and nature of diplomatic 
immunity. Part II analyzes the issues domestic-worker litigants face 
in trying to seek judicial relief for the abuse and discusses the limited 
nature of judicial remedies. Part III explores immigration and 
institutional policies and initiatives, along with various additional 
mechanisms, to prevent domestic workers from entering into abusive 
situations and to provide assistance resources for them if they are in 
an abusive environment. Lastly, Part IV discusses the diplomatic 
process and the measures the U.S. Department of State (State 
Department) has taken to combat trafficking inside diplomatic 
residences located on American soil. It also lays out several steps that 
the State Department may take in the future to combat this problem. 
I. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY OVERVIEW  
Though the exploitation of domestic workers by foreign diplomats 
clearly falls within the definition of trafficking in persons accepted by 
the U.S. and U.N.,
20
 diplomats have remained largely immune from 
suits brought by their employees because of the almost absolute 
nature of diplomatic immunity. Diplomatic immunity from criminal 
and civil suits has been an established international practice for 
centuries
21
 and was codified as international law in the VCDR, which 
                                                                                                                 
20 See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.  
21 See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 280–83 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction can be traced back to sixteenth century practices and immunity from civil suit was a 
―well established rule‖ by the early eighteenth century); Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812) (―‗It is impossible to conceive . . . that a Prince who sends an 
ambassador or any other minister can have any intention of subjecting him to the authority of a 
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is almost universally adopted.
22
 The purpose of the VCDR ―is not to 
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the 
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.‖23 Under the 
VCDR, diplomats and their families have immunity from the 
receiving State‘s civil and administrative jurisdiction.24 Congress later 
enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,
25
 which provides that 
―[a]ny action or proceeding brought against an individual who is 
entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . shall be 
dismissed.‖26 The Act further provides that a defendant can establish 
diplomatic immunity by simply filing a motion or suggestion 
claiming such immunity.
27
 Courts rely on the State Department‘s 
formal recognition of the defendant as a diplomat and accept the 




U.N. representatives are entitled to the same level of full immunity 
as diplomats.
29
 U.N. representatives‘ immunity is derived from the 
Headquarters Agreement,
30
 which established the U.N. headquarters 
in New York City and governs the relationship between the U.N. and 
the United States.
31
 Article V, section 15 provides that U.N. 
representatives ―shall, whether residing inside or outside the 
headquarters district, be entitled in the territory of the United States to 
the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding 
conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys 
accredited to it.‖32  
                                                                                                                 
 
foreign power . . . .‘‖ (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OF THE 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF NATURE 471 (1797))). 
22 See Denza, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that 185 states are parties to the VCDR, which 
―is close to the entire number of independent States in the world‖).  
23 VCDR, supra note 19, at pmbl. cl. 4.  
24 Id. art. 31(1) (―A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from [the receiving State‘s] 
civil and administrative jurisdiction.‖); id. art. 37 (―The members of the family of a diplomatic 
agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy 
the privileges and immunities specified in article 29 to 36.‖).  
25 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a–254e (2006). 
26 Id. § 254d. 
27 Id. 
28 Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192 (D.D.C. 2007).  
29 Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
23, 2002) (―Both the United States and the United Nations agree that permanent representatives 
and ministers of foreign nations to the United Nations are entitled to full diplomatic immunity, 
that is, the immunities codified in the Vienna Convention.‖).  
30 Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 756. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. art. V, § 15(4).  
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Representatives of the U.N. and other international organizations, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
also are afforded a more limited immunity under the International 
Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA).
33
 The IOIA provides that 
officers, employees, and representatives of foreign governments to 
international organizations ―shall be immune from suit and legal 
process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity 
and falling within their functions as such representatives, officers, or 




II. LEGAL OBSTACLES AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES  
Over the past decade, domestic-worker litigants have presented a 
wide gamut of arguments for why the trafficking of domestic workers 
inside the diplomat‘s residence falls outside of the activities covered 
by diplomatic immunity. They have argued that: employing a 
domestic worker falls within the commercial-activities exception;
35
 
human trafficking is a jus cogens exception to diplomatic immunity;
36
 
involuntary servitude is a tort in violation of internationally 
recognized norms of international law;
37
 human trafficking violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery;
38
 and 
defrauding the American government should not be covered by 
diplomatic immunity.
39
 However, because of the strict adherence to 
full diplomatic immunity for a current diplomat or state representative 
in international organizations, courts have consistently remained 
unsympathetic to these arguments and found in favor of the 
diplomat.
40
 Only when the domestic worker waited until the 
diplomat‘s term inside the United States expired and brought suit 
under the residual immunity theory have litigants experienced any 
form of judicial relief.
41
  
                                                                                                                 
33 22 U.S.C. § 288d (2006).  
34 Id. § 288d(b) (emphasis added).  
35 See discussion infra Part II.A.1.  
36 See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
37 See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
38 See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
39 See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
40 See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th 
Cir. 1996); Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007); Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 
605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C 2009); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224 (DLC), 2002 WL 
1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
41 See, e.g., Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, Nos. 09-2525-cv (L), 09-3615-cv (XAP), 2010 WL 3719219 (2d. Cir. 
Sept. 24, 2010) (holding that, because defendant's ―diplomatic duties in the United States had 
terminated and he had departed the country,‖ he is no longer entitled to the privileges he once 
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A. Suits Brought Against the Diplomat While the Diplomat Is an 
Accredited Diplomat in the United States 
1. Commercial-Activities Exception 
An important exception to the general rule of absolute immunity 
for current diplomats is the commercial-activities exception. Article 
31(1)(c) of the VCDR states that a diplomat is not immune from suit 
arising from actions ―relating to any professional or commercial 
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State 
outside his official functions.‖42 The VCDR expressly prohibits 
diplomats from engaging in any professional or commercial activity 
for personal profit within the receiving State.
43
 In their litigation, 








fall ―outside [diplomats‘] official functions.‖ This section explains the 
U.S. government and federal courts‘ reasoning in consistently 
rejecting this use of the commercial-activities exception to diplomatic 
immunity. 
The VCDR does not provide a concrete definition of ―commercial 
activities,‖ so the courts and the government have looked to the 
negotiating history of the VCDR to determine its meaning. The 
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC), a group of 
international-law experts, prepared an initial draft of the VCDR, 
which was considered at a formal U.N. conference in 1961.
47
 It was 
not until the ILC‘s Ninth Session that Alfred Verdross of Austria 
proposed an amendment creating an exception to immunity for acts 
―‗relating to a professional activity outside [the diplomatic agent‘s] 
official duties.‘‖48 Though many members of the Commission thought 
that the clause was redundant and unnecessary because diplomats 
were barred from participating in professional and business activities, 
                                                                                                                 
 
retained as a Kuwati diplomat); Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that, as a former diplomat, defendant was entitled to a much more limited form of 
immunity than that of a current diplomat). 
42 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 31(1)(c).  
43 Id. art. 42.  
44 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 287–88; Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190.  
45 Tabion, at 287–88; Gonzales Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190. 
46 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126 (D.D.C 2009). 
47 United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 1 Official 
Records 79–82, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/14, U.N. Sales No. 61.X.2 (1961).  
48 Statement of Interest of the United States at 8, Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 
122 (D.D.C 2009) (No. 07-115) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi] (quoting Summary 
Records of the 402nd Meeting, [1957] 1 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 97, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1957).  
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the Commission decided to include the amendment. In addition, the 
Commission added the adjective ―commercial,‖ based on the rare, but 
possible, occurrence of diplomats engaging in commercial activities 
outside their official functions.
49
 When an Australian member 
suggested that the term ―commercial activity‖ needed an explanation, 
the Special Rapporteur responded that ―the use of the words 
‗commercial activity‘ as part of the phrase ‗a professional or 
commercial activity‘ indicates that it is not a single act of commerce 
which is meant, by [sic] a continuous activity.‖50 The ILC was 
concerned that if the exception encompassed single transactions, then 
―the door would be open to a gradual whittling away of the 
diplomatic agent‘s immunities from jurisdiction.‖51 
The ILC added the amendment largely because the members did 
not believe that a diplomat should be able to claim immunity for acts 
forbidden in the VCDR.
52
 In response to an American member‘s 
remark that this exception went beyond existing international law, the 
Special Rapportuer explained that the exception was aimed at 
activities that conflicted with diplomatic status. The Special 
Rapportuer asserted, ―[i]t would be quite improper if a diplomatic 
agent, ignoring the restraints [on engaging in professional and 
commercial activities] which his status ought to have imposed upon 
him, could, by claiming immunity, force the client to go abroad in 
order to have the case settled by a foreign court.‖53 In the Report of 
the Commission to the General Assembly, the Commission explained, 
―activities of these kinds are normally wholly inconsistent with the 
position of a diplomatic agent, and that one possible consequence of 
his engaging in them might be that he would be declared persona non 
grata.‖54 The Commission continued by explaining that if the 
diplomat does engage in commercial activities, then ―the persons with 
                                                                                                                 
49 Tabion, 877 F.Supp. at 290 (citing Summary Records of the 402nd Meeting, supra note 
48).  
50 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 9 (quoting Special Rapporteur, Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities: Summary of Observations Received from Governments and 
Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/116 (1958) (by A. Emil F. 
Sandstruöm)).  
51 Id. at 10 (quoting Summary Records of the 476th Meeting, [1958] 1 Y.B. Int‘l L. 
Comm‘n 244, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958).  
52 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 42 (―A diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State 
practise for personal profit any professional or commercial activity‖). 
53 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 10 (quoting Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities, supra note 50 at 57.  
54 Id. at 11 (quoting Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/ 
Add.1). Persona non grata is Latin for ―an unwelcome person.‖ 
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whom the diplomatic agent has had commercial or professional 
relations cannot be deprived of their ordinary remedies.‖55  
The U.S. had another reason for accepting the commercial-
activities exception. In its instructions to the U.S. delegation to the 
U.N. conference at which the ILC draft was considered, the State 
Department highlighted that ―[w]hile American diplomatic officers 
are forbidden to engage in such activities in the country of their 
assignment, other states have not all been so inclined to restrict the 
activities of their diplomatic agents.‖56 The instructions further 
explained that the commercial-activities exception would ―enable 
persons in the receiving State who have professional and business 
dealings of a non-diplomatic character with a diplomatic agent to 
have the same recourse against him in the courts as they would have 
against a non-diplomatic person engaging in similar activities.‖57  
The negotiating history of the exception was the basis for the U.S. 
government‘s rebuttal to domestic workers‘ arguments that their 
employment relationship fell within the commercial-activities 
exception. The U.S. government argued in its Statements of Interest
58
 
that the commercial-activity exception ―focuses on the pursuit of 
trade or business activity unrelated to diplomatic work‖59 and ―does 
not encompass contractual relationships for goods and services 
incidental to the daily life of the diplomat and the diplomat‘s family 
in the receiving State.‖60 The Department of Justice concluded that 
diplomats are immune from suits brought by their domestic-worker 
employees alleging breach of employment contract and violation of 
federal employment laws.
61
 The courts have mostly deferred to the 
government‘s Statements of Interest because the Supreme Court has 
held that, ―although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty 
                                                                                                                 
55 Id. (quoting Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 54).  
56 Id. (quoting 7 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DEP‘T OF STATE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 406 (1970)). 
57 Id. (quoting WHITEMAN, supra note 56 at 406). 
58 The Department of Justice submits Statements of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 
(2006) (―The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the 
Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the 
United States in a suit pending in a court in the United States . . . .‖). 
59 Id. at 6; Statement of Interest of the United States at 8, Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 
F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-cv-00089-PLF) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez 
Paredes]; see also Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537–38 (4th Cir. 1996). 
60 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 7; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez Paredes, 
supra note 59, at 5 (same); see also Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537 (―When examined in context, the 
term ‗commercial activity‘ does not have so broad a meaning as to include occasional service 
contracts.‖).  
61 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 5; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzalez Paredes, 
supra note 59, at 2. 
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provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation 
and enforcement is entitled to great weight.‖62  
In Tabion v. Mufti,
63
 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia was the first to tackle the question of 
whether the employment relationship between a domestic worker and 
a foreign diplomat falls within the commercial-activities exception. 
Corazon Tabion accepted a position as a domestic servant for Faris 
Mufti, the First Secretary at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, 
D.C. Mufti promised to pay Tabion the U.S. minimum wage, plus 
overtime, and a ―reasonable work schedule in a comfortable 
environment.‖64 Upon arrival, Mufti confiscated her passport, forced 
her to work sixteen hours a day for fifty cents an hour, with no 
overtime pay, and threatened termination, deportation, and arrest if 
she tried to leave the residence.
65
 After working for twenty-eight 
months, Tabion brought suit against Mufti under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act
66
 for not paying minimum wage plus overtime, breach 
of the employment contract, intentional misrepresentations, false 
imprisonment, and discrimination based on race.
67
 In response to 
Mufti‘s motion to quash based on diplomatic immunity, Tabion 
argued that her case fell within the commercial-activities exception.
68
  
Because the term ―commercial activities‖ was not defined in the 
VCDR, the court looked to the drafting and negotiating history of the 
VCDR and the exception, as well as the government‘s Statement of 
Interest.
69
 The district court determined that ―the Commission did not 
intend to deprive diplomats of immunity for commercial transactions 
that are unrelated to the pursuit of a business or trade, but that are 
merely incidental to day-to-day life.‖70 The district court dismissed 
the case because the negotiating history ―points persuasively to the 
conclusion that Article 31(1)(c) was not intended to carve out a broad 
exception to diplomatic immunity for a diplomat‘s daily contractual 
transactions for personal goods and services.‖71 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s 
decision and added that the exception does not ―have so broad a 
                                                                                                                 
62 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)). 
63 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).  
64 Id. at 286. 
65 Id.  
66 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–207 (2006).  
67 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 286.  
68 Id. at 287.  
69 Id. at 289–91; see also supra notes 47–57.  
70 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 290.  
71 Id. at 291.  
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meaning as to include occasional service contracts as [Plaintiff] 
contends, but rather relates only to trade or business activity engaged 
in for personal profit.‖72 The court continued by stating that the 
―[d]ay-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic help 
were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat‘s official 
functions. Because these services are incidental to daily life, 
diplomats are immune from disputes arising out of them.‖73 
Courts outside the Fourth Circuit have adopted Tabion’s definition 
of commercial activity in the domestic-worker context.
74
 
Additionally, the government has consistently urged the court to 
adopt this interpretation in its Statements of Interest.
75
 The United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, for example, 
rejected the commercial-activities exception claim brought by Lucia 
Mabel Gonzalez Paredes. Gonzalez Paredes, a domestic worker from 
Paraguay, was hired by an Argentinean diplomat in Washington, 
D.C., and worked for an average of seventy-seven hours per week, for 
only five hundred dollars a month.
76
 Gonzalez Paredes essentially 
argued that the employment relationship constituted a commercial 
activity outside the diplomat‘s official function, thereby falling within 
Article 42 of the VCDR.
77
 Relying on the holding in Tabion and the 
government‘s Statement of Interest, the court found ―no reason to 
disagree with the conclusion of the Department of State—and the 
Fourth Circuit—that a contract for domestic services such as the one 
at issue in this case is not itself a ‗commercial activity.‘‖78  
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
reaffirmed the Gonzalez Paredes rationale two years later in Sabbithi 
v. Al Saleh.
79
 Based on these decisions and on the government‘s 
consistent stance against the employment relationship being a 
commercial-activities exception, it is unlikely that the commercial-
activities exception will be a useful tool for future domestic-servant 
plaintiffs.  
                                                                                                                 
72 Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996). 
73 Id. at 538–39.  
74 E.g., Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2007); Sabbithi v. Al 
Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2009), . 
75 E.g., Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48; Gov‘t Statement, Gonzales Paredes, 
supra note 59.  
76 Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 190. This practice violated the contract presented 
at the American Embassy, in which the diplomat agreed to pay Gonzales Paredes $6.72 per 
hour, plus overtime. Id.  
77 Id. at 192.  
78 Id. at 193.  
79 605 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (―Hiring household help is incidental to the daily life of a 
diplomat and therefore not commercial for purposes of the exception to the Vienna 
Convention.‖). 
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2. Customary International Law Exceptions 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
80
 defines a jus 
cogens norm as ―a peremptory norm of general international law . . . 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.‖81 Jus cogens norms hold the highest position in 
international law and supersede treaties and customary international 
law.
82
 Therefore, if a provision of a treaty conflicts with a jus cogens 
norm, then the conflicting treaty provision is void.
83
 Many litigants 
have argued that granting immunity to diplomats who traffic 
household workers inside their residences violates the jus cogens 
norm prohibiting slavery, and courts should therefore deny motions 
for immunity. However, as this section explains, courts have 
consistently rejected this argument.  
In Gonzalez Paredes, the court declined to address the issue of 
whether the diplomat‘s conduct violated jus cogens norms because 
the plaintiff did not allege slavery or human trafficking in the 
complaint.
84
 Two years later, Mani Kumari Sabbithi, a domestic 
worker from India who was employed by Major Waleed KH N.S. Al 
Saleh during his tenure as Attaché to the Embassy of Kuwait in the 
U.S., brought suit in the same court explicitly alleging slavery in 
violation of jus cogens norms.
85
 Al Saleh lured Sabbithi to the U.S. 
with an employment contract promising her a $1,314 monthly salary 
and compliance with U.S. labor laws that Al Saleh presented to the 
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.
86
 Al Saleh did not abide by the contract, but 
instead took her passport, forced her to work sixteen to nineteen hours 
a day, seven days a week, sent only $242 to $346 per month directly 




Sabbithi argued that the court should deny diplomatic immunity 
because the diplomat‘s conduct constituted human trafficking and 
thus violated jus cogens norms prohibiting slavery.
88
 Sabbithi further 
argued that the VCDR similarly conflicts with jus cogens norms 
                                                                                                                 
80 May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
81 Id. art. 53. 
82 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C 2009) (citing Comm. of U.S. 
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 80, art. 53.  
84 Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 195 (D.D.C. 2007). 
85 Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 122. 
86 Id. at 125.  
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 129. 
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because it immunizes slaveholders from liability.
89
 The government 
disagreed and made clear that the U.S. position was that there is no 
jus cogens exception to diplomatic immunity.
90
 The government 
argued, ―diplomatic immunity is itself a fundamental principle of 
international law and there is no evidence that the international 
community has come to recognize a jus cogens exception to 
diplomatic immunity.‖91 The government was particularly concerned 
that straying from this global consensus would lead to a heightened 
risk of other states subjecting American diplomats to contentious 
litigation in foreign jurisdictions.
92
 Accepting the government‘s 
position, the court decided that there was no jus cogens norm at issue 
because the evidence did not convince the court that the diplomat‘s 
conduct constituted human trafficking.
93
  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York has similarly rejected the argument that because involuntary 
servitude is a tort in violation of internationally recognized norms of 
international law, the court has jurisdiction under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA).
94
 The ATCA grants district courts original 
jurisdiction over ―any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.‖95 The Supreme Court addressed customary international 
law‘s relation to the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.96 The court 
determined that Congress, at the time of the ATCA‘s passage, 
intended three types of torts to be covered: ―violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.‖97 
The Court mentioned the possibility of new causes of action but 
noted, ―any claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest 
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world 
and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms we have recognized.‖98 While the Second Circuit 
has allowed ATCA claims to proceed when the defendant was not 
immune,
 
when the court found defendants to be immune, it rejected 
ATCA claims because the ATCA does not supersede diplomatic 
                                                                                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 20. 
91 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
92 Id. at 21.  
93 Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
94 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 
1964806, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
95 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
96 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  
97 Id. at 715. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (1769)). 
98 Id. at 725. 
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immunity.
99
 Therefore, it is more than likely that future diplomat 
defendants will prevail over any arguments that their conduct violates 
established customary international law and will continue to be 
unscathed by suits brought during their tenure.  
3. Thirteenth-Amendment Claims 
Litigants have also been unsuccessful in arguing that diplomats 
should be subject to liability for constitutional claims arising under 
the Thirteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude. In Ahmed v. Hoque,
100
 the court rejected the plaintiff‘s 
argument that the court should create an exception to diplomatic 
immunity for constitutional claims.
101
 The court reasoned that case 
law does not establish that all constitutional claims, including those 
not prompted by congressional enactment, must be heard in a judicial 
forum.
102
 Instead, the court cited the political-question and the 
sovereign-immunity doctrines in support of its argument that ―some 
constitutional claims can and do go unheard.‖103 Similarly, in 
Sabbithi, the court and the government stated that precedent suggests 
that diplomats are shielded from liability for alleged constitutional 
violations under diplomatic immunity.
104
 The government further 
explained, ―although Plaintiffs correctly note that treaty provisions 
are subject to constitutional limitations, there is no conflict between 
the Vienna Convention and the Thirteenth Amendment. Nothing in 
the Vienna Convention authorizes involuntary servitude or any other 
practice forbidden by the Constitution . . . .‖105  
4. Fraud 
Gonzalez Paredes, a domestic worker from Paraguay who worked 
for an Argentinean diplomat in Washington, D.C., also tried to argue 
that her diplomat employer was not entitled to diplomatic immunity 
because he defrauded the U.S. government. Specifically, the diplomat 
instructed Gonzales Paredes to tell the U.S. Embassy that the 
diplomat agreed to pay her the amount specified in the employment 
                                                                                                                 
99 See, e.g., Ahmed, 2002 WL 1964806, at *8 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247 
(2d Cir. 1995) and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
100 No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 2002). 
101 Id. at *6–7.  
102 Id. at *7. 
103 Id. (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994)).  
104 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.D.C. 2009); Gov‘t Statement, 
Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 21 (―Indeed, we are not aware of any United States court that has 
recognized a jus cogens exception to a diplomat's immunity from its civil jurisdiction.‖). 
105 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 18–19 (citation omitted). 
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contract presented at the embassy instead of the lower wages he told 
her he would pay. The court immediately rejected this argument on 
the basis that the VCDR does not recognize fraud as an exception to 
diplomatic immunity. The court asserted that this is an argument that 
should be presented to Congress or the State Department and that the 
courts have no authority over this matter.
106
  
B. Suits Brought Under Residual Immunity After the  
Diplomat’s Term Expires 
Thus far, domestic workers have only been successful in defeating 
motions to dismiss when they waited until the diplomats were no 
longer serving in their official capacities and then sued under the 
theory that the diplomats were no longer protected by residual 
immunity.
107
 Article 39 of the VCDR provides the basis for this 
argument, stating, ―[w]hen the functions of a person enjoying 
privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and 
immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the 
country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but 
shall subsist until that time . . . .‖108 However, Article 39 grants 
continuing immunity for those ―acts performed by such persons in the 
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission . . . .‖109 
Therefore, the determinative issue is whether the diplomat performed 
the acts in question in the exercise of his or her diplomatic functions. 
If the acts constitute official functions, then the former diplomat 
remains immune from suit; but if the acts fall outside diplomatic 
functions, then the former diplomat becomes liable for those actions 
in court.  
District judges seem to be a driving force behind this newfound 
effort to allow domestic-servant claims to proceed under the theory 
that residual immunity does not shield the diplomat from all claims. 
Although the court in Gonzalez Paredes granted the defendant‘s 
motion to dismiss, the district judge added that the complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice, and that the claims could be re-filed if 
and when the diplomat no longer enjoyed full diplomatic immunity.
110
 
He even proceeded to recommend that the statute of limitations be 
tolled until the diplomat was no longer immune from suit.
111
 
                                                                                                                 
106 Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D.D.C. 2007). 
107 Residual immunity is also referred to as ―functional‖ and ―continuing‖ immunity, but 
this Note will consistently refer to it simply as ―residual immunity.‖  
108 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2).  
109 Id.  
110 Gonzalez Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 189.  
111 Id. at 189 n.2 (citing Knab v. Republic of Georgia, No. 97-3118, 1998 WL 34067108, 
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Therefore, he impliedly recommended that the plaintiff relitigate the 
case under the theory of residual immunity once the diplomat ceased 
serving in his official capacity.  
Another district court judge made a similar recommendation to 
Vishranthamma Swarna. She originally brought suit against her 
diplomat employer, Badar Al-Awadi, a diplomat stationed at the 
Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the U.N. in New York 
City, but the Southern District of New York dismissed her case 
because Al-Awadi was then still employed by the Kuwait Mission 
and was therefore entitled to full diplomatic immunity.
112
 The judge, 
however, dismissed her case ―without prejudice because plaintiff 
could plausible [sic] institute a new action against defendants now 
that they are no longer associated with the Kuwaiti Mission.‖113  
Swarna re-filed her suit against Al-Awadi once he concluded his 
diplomatic service in New York and was reassigned to the Embassy 
of Kuwait in Paris.
114
 Swarna had to overcome service hurdles 
because of Al-Awadi‘s new post, but the district court judge still 
seemed open to finding a way to bring the diplomat into court. 
Swarna first served the State Department‘s Office of the Legal 
Advisor and then attempted to serve Al-Awadi and his wife under the 
Hague Service Convention.
115
 However, because of his diplomatic 
status in France, the French government refused service.
116
 Despite 
the U.S. government‘s objection, the judge granted the plaintiff‘s 
motion for alternative service by an international courier that records 
the delivery in writing or electronically and by U.S. mail in 
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).
117
 Thus, 
Swarna was able to overcome the obstacle of Al-Awadi‘s ability to 
claim diplomatic immunity in his subsequent post.  
                                                                                                                 
 
at *4 (D.D.C. May 29, 1998)).  
112 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, Nos. 09-2525-cv (L), 09-3615-cv (XAP), 2010 WL 3719219 (2d. Cir. Sept. 24, 2010). 
For factual background, see supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.  
113 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d. at 514 (quoting Summary Order, Vishranthamma v. Al-
Awadi, No. 02 Civ. 3710 (PKL)(MHD) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2006). 
114 See id. 
115 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 
163. (―Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward 
documents, for the purpose of service, to those authorities of another contracting State wich 
[sic] are designated by the latter for this purpose. Each contracting State may, if exceptional 
circumstances so require, use diplomatic channels for the same purpose.‖). 
116 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 06 Civ. 4880 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72661, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007). 
117 Id. at *4–5. 
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Finally, in March 2009, Swarna became the first domestic servant 
to win a default judgment against her diplomat employer based on the 
theory of residual immunity.
118
 The district court rejected Al-Awadi‘s 
argument that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based on 
diplomatic immunity because Al-Awadi was a former diplomat to the 
U.S. who had already left the country and was therefore entitled to the 
more limited immunity in U.S. courts under Article 39 of the 
VCDR.
119
 Since a former diplomat has immunity only for ―‗acts 
performed . . . in the exercise of his functions as a member of the 
mission,‘‖ the court had to determine whether Al-Awadi‘s acts were 
―private acts,‖ and therefore not covered by immunity, or ―official 
acts,‖ which fell within residual immunity.120 Once again, the court 
looked to the purpose of diplomatic immunity, which ―‗is not to 
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the 
functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.‘‖121 The court 
explained that once a diplomat‘s duties have terminated in the host 
country, ―there ceases to be a reason to immunize that person from 
criminal or civil jurisdiction of the Receiving State‖ because the 
purpose of the immunity is not to give a personal benefit to the 
diplomat but to ensure the efficient functioning of the mission.
122
 
Once the diplomat‘s duties have ended, the efficient functioning of 
the mission will no longer be affected if the former diplomat is held 
responsible for ―private acts.‖123 However, ―‗acts performed . . . in the 
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission‘‖ continue to be 
covered under residual immunity because ―official acts‖ are imputed 
to, and thus indirectly implicate, the sending State.
124
 
What constitutes an official act? The court explained, ―official 
acts‖ irrefutably encompass the Article 3 listing of ―functions of [the] 
diplomatic mission.‖125 However, if an act is ―entirely peripheral to 
the diplomat‘s official duties,‖ then it will likely not fall within the 
                                                                                                                 
118 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  
119 Id. at 516–17. 
120 Id. (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2)). 
121 Id. at 516 (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, pmbl., cl. 4).  
122 Id. at 516–17. 
123 Id. at 517.  
124 Id. at 516–17 (quoting VCDR, supra note 19, art. 39(2)).  
125 Id. at 517 & n.10 (―The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in: (a) 
representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b) protecting in the receiving State the 
interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international 
law; (c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; (d) ascertaining by all lawful 
means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting them thereon to the 
Government of the sending State; (e) prompting friendly relations between the sending State and 
the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural, and scientific relations.‖ (quoting 
VCDR, supra note 19, art. 3(1))). 
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grant of residual immunity.
126
 The Swarna court also noted that other 
courts have held that employment decisions and relationships at a 
diplomatic mission were covered by residual immunity because an 
element of the diplomat‘s official duties is to staff the mission and the 
mission cannot efficiently function without the employment of certain 
personnel.
127
 However, the court asserted, ―[i]t does not follow that 
all employment-related acts by a diplomat are official acts to which 
residual immunity attaches once the diplomat‘s duties end.‖128 The 
court reasoned that when a diplomat employs a person unrelated to 
the diplomatic mission, it is not the same as an act performed on 
behalf of the sending State, such as staffing a diplomatic mission.
129
 
The court decided that the employment relationship between Swarna 
and Al-Awadi constituted a private act because the employment of a 
household worker did not fall within the meaning of Article 3, nor 
was it part of the implementation of official policy of the sending 
State.
130
 Instead, Al-Awadi hired Swarna to take care of his family‘s 
personal affairs in his private residence.
131
 The court dismissed the 
―tangential benefit‖ to the Kuwaiti Mission of Swarna occasionally 
serving members of the Mission while Al-Awadi was entertaining 
them at his home.
132
 Therefore, the court held that plaintiff won a 
default judgment on her labor-law claims because Al-Awadi‘s failure 




Swarna was also successful in winning a default judgment for 
―trafficking, involuntary servitude, enslavement, forced labor, rape 
and sexual slavery‖134 brought under the ATCA.135 In determining 
that ―trafficking, involuntary servitude, enslavement, forced labor, 
and sexual slavery‖ were ―private acts,‖ the court analogized this case 
                                                                                                                 
126 Id. at 518; see also United States v. Guinand, 688 F. Supp. 774, 776–77 (D.D.C. 1988) 
(holding that a former diplomat who distributed cocaine during his term as diplomat was not 
entitled to residual immunity). 
127 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d. at 518; see also Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 
313, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing a suit brought by U.N. employees against former U.N. 
officials and the U.N. for sexual harassment, employment discrimination, and indecent battery 
based on the rationale that ―courts have consistently found that functional immunity applies to 
employment-related suits against officials of international organizations‖); De Luca v. United 
Nations, 841 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that U.N. officials‘ wrongful conduct 
in the workplace was covered by IOIA because employment activities qualify as official 
conduct).  
128 Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
129 Id. at 519–20. 
130 Id. at 520. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 522. 
135 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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to United States v. Guinand.
136
 Guinand held that a former diplomat 
who distributed cocaine during his tenure was not immune from 
prosecution under his residual immunity because the illegal cocaine 
distribution was completely peripheral to his official diplomatic 
duties.
137
 The Swarna court explained, ―to conclude that the residual 
diplomatic immunity provided by Art. 39 extends to rape, forced 
labor, and the other malicious acts alleged here would be tantamount 
to holding that . . . all acts of a diplomatic agent are ‗official acts‘‖ 
and that there is ―no support for such a proposition.‖138 Finding these 
―private acts‖ entirely peripheral to the diplomat‘s duties and 
therefore outside the realm of residual immunity, the court granted 
Swarna a default judgment as to her ATCA claims.
139
  
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court‘s decision 
that Al-Awadi was not protected by residual immunity.
140
 The court 
rejected Al-Awadi‘s argument that Swarna‘s role was to help him 
with mission-related functions and thus he was immune from suit.
141
 
The court pointed to several facts to support its conclusion that 
Swarna was employed to attend to the diplomat‘s private needs.142 
First, the nature of her responsibilities, such as cooking, cleaning, 
taking care of the children, was personal rather than related to the 
mission.
143
 Second, Swarna‘s cooking for and serving guests at 
official functions were merely incidental to her position as his private 
servant.
144
 Thirdly, Al-Awadi, not the mission, paid for her 
services.
145
 Lastly, Swarna was issued a G-5 visa, which is issued to 
―attendants, servants, and personal employees of any such 
representative,‖146 rather than a G-2 visa, which is issued to ―other 
accredited representatives of such a foreign government.‖147 The court 
made clear that even if Swarna‘s employment could be deemed an 
official act, ―[o]nly if the commission of such crimes could be 
considered an official act would residual immunity apply.‖148  
Although the Second Circuit found that residual immunity did not 
bar Swarna‘s claims, it held that the default judgment was improperly 
                                                                                                                 
136 688 F. Supp. 774 (D.D.C. 1988). 
137 Swarna, 607 F.Supp. 2d at 521. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 522.  
140 Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 140 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
141 Id. at 137–38.  
142 Id. at 138. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  
146 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(G)(v)(2006).  
147 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(G)(v)(2006); Swarna, 622 F.3d at 138. 
148 Swarna, 622 F.3d at 12. 
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granted.
149
 It determined that Al-Awadi‘s default was not willful, but 
was based on the mistaken belief that he was immune from suit.
150
 
Secondly, the court determined that setting aside the default judgment 
would not prejudice Swarna‘s claims.151 Despite the court‘s decision 
to set aside the default judgment, the Second Circuit‘s decision will 
be valuable precedent for other domestic servants who bring claims 
against their former diplomat employers after their official tenure is 
concluded.  
Plaintiffs can also turn to Baoanan v. Baja
152
 to support their 
claims against former diplomats. Marichu Suarez Baoanan, a recent 
nursing graduate, paid Norma Castro Baja, the wife of the Permanent 
Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, 250,000 
Philippine Pesos in what Baoanan thought was an exchange for travel 
to the U.S., a U.S. employment-based visa, and help in finding a 
nursing position. Upon Baoanan‘s arrival in New York City, 
however, Baja‘s driver drove Baoanan directly to the Bajas‘ residence 
at the Philippine Mission. Mrs. Baja then confiscated Baoanan‘s 
passport and informed her that she had to work for six months to pay 
off an additional 250,000 pesos for travel expenses and employment 
arrangements. The Bajas forced Baoanan to work eighteen hours per 
day, seven days a week, performing household tasks, monitoring Mrs. 
Baja‘s blood pressure and diabetes, providing child care for the Bajas‘ 
son, and preparing for and cleaning up after weekly parties. The Bajas 
never paid Baoanan for her services, fed her only leftovers, verbally 
abused and denigrated her, made her sleep in the basement with only 
one sheet, restricted her use of the telephone, and refused to let her 
leave the house unaccompanied.
153
 
When Baoanan brought suit against Baja, the parties first focused 
on whether Baja‘s conduct fell within the commercial-activities 
exception of the VCDR.
154
 Under this theory, it is highly likely that 
the court would have dismissed Baoanan‘s suit because of the 
expansive reach of diplomatic immunity. However, in its Statement of 
Interest, the government argued that the court should instead focus on 
whether to apply residual immunity because Baoanan filed the 
complaint on June 24, 2008, and Baja‘s term ended on February 21, 
2007.
155
 The government explained that it has ―consistently 
                                                                                                                 
149 Id. at 15. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 158–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
153 Id. at 158–59. 
154 Id. at 159–60.  
155 Statement of Interest of the United States, at 2, Baonan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Gov‘t Statement, Baoanan]. 
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interpreted Article 39 of the VCDR to permit the exercise of U.S. 
jurisdiction over persons whose status as members of the diplomatic 
mission has been terminated for acts they committed during the 
period in which they enjoyed privileges and immunities,‖ but not ―for 
acts performed in the exercise of the functions as a member of the 
mission.‖156 The government supported its position by stating that its 
interpretation is ―consistent with the practice of other sovereign 
states, including [those] which are parties to the Vienna 
Convention.‖157 
In its Statement of Interest, the government discussed the district 
court‘s analysis of residual immunity in Sabbithi v. Al Saleh.158 Since 
Sabbithi filed her complaint and served Baja with process while he 
was still an accredited diplomat, the government recommended—and 
the court granted—the diplomat‘s motion to dismiss based on 
diplomatic immunity. At the end of the opinion, the court discussed 
the possibility of the residual-immunity claim. The court held that the 
―defendant‘s immunity remains intact for acts performed in the 
exercise of his duties as a diplomatic officer‖ even after his term had 
ended because the employment of the plaintiff ―was not performed 
outside the exercise of defendants‘ diplomatic functions.‖159 The 
government did not comment on residual immunity in its Statement 
of Interest in the Sabbithi case because it was not applicable, but the 
government ―respectfully disagree[d]‖ with the Sabbithi court‘s 
residual-immunity analysis in its Statement of Interest for Baoanan.
160
 
Specifically, it disagreed with the ―belief that if the hiring of domestic 
employees is not a commercial activity under Article 31(1)(c), it 
follows that it must be an official act and therefore merits residual 
immunity provided under Article 39(2).‖161 Rather, the government 
recommended that even if a former diplomat‘s conduct was not a 
commercial activity, the court should conduct a separate analysis to 
determine whether the former diplomat‘s conduct was an official act, 
therefore falling within the grant of residual immunity.
162
 
The court in Baoanan adopted the government‘s recommended 
approach and concurred with the Swarna court‘s analysis in 
determining whether the conduct constituted an ―official act.‖163 The 
                                                                                                                 
156 Id. at 6 (internal citation omitted).  
157 Id. at 7 (internal citation omitted). 
158 Id. at 11. For the facts of Sabbithi, see supra text accompanying notes 85–87.  
159 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009).  
160 Gov‘t Statement, Baoanan, supra note 155, at 12. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 14.  
163 Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (―[A]cts allegedly 
committed by Baja that were performed in the furtherance of his diplomatic functions such that 
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court first rejected Baja‘s argument that the mere act of hiring a 
domestic worker was an official act and then examined the specific 
circumstances of the employment to ascertain whether the act was 
private or official.
164
 The court also rejected Baja‘s argument that the 
Philippine government‘s issuance of a red passport (i.e. a government 
passport) and the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines granting of a G-5 
visa (which is granted to employees of officials for international 
organizations) made it an official act.
165
 The court noted that the 
documents themselves describe the employment of domestic workers 
as a private act.
166
  
The court also analyzed Baoanan‘s duties of cooking, cleaning, 
doing laundry, monitoring Mrs. Baja‘s blood pressure, and providing 
child care, and determined that these services were performed only to 
benefit the Baja family‘s personal needs and ―are unrelated to Baja‘s 
diplomatic functions as a member of the mission.‖ 167 Following the 
Swarna analysis, the court concluded that the ―tangential benefit‖ to 
the Philippine Mission gained from Baoanan‘s preparing for and 
cleaning up after the Bajas‘ parties was not enough.168  
Lastly, the court analyzed Baja‘s argument that this case should 
come out differently because the family resided at the Philippine 
Mission itself, whereas the diplomat in Swarna had a separate private 
residence.
169
 The court held that while it should consider the physical 
location of the employment, that location was not dispositive.
170
 
Based on this analysis, the court held that Baoanan‘s employment as a 
domestic worker at the Philippine Mission was a private act and 
therefore Baja was not immune from civil jurisdiction.
171
  
Baoanan also brought claims of human trafficking, involuntary 
servitude, and forced labor. The court held that these actions, if true, 
were not performed as a function of the mission nor on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
they are ‗in law the acts of the sending state‘ are official acts; all other acts are private acts for 
which residual immunity is not available.‖ (quoting DENZA, supra note 21, at 439)). 
164 Id. at 165–70.  
165 Id. at 167.  
166 Id. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs‘ guidelines for issuing a red passport 
provide ―information and guidance [to] Foreign Service personnel who wish to bring private 
staff to their posts of assignment.‖ Id. (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the G-5 passport 
is granted to ―an attendant or personal employee of an official or other employee of a diplomatic 
or consular mission or international organization.‖ Id. at 168 (internal quotations omitted). 
167 Id. at 168. 
168 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
169 Id. at 168–69.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 170.  
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With the Swarna and Baoanan decisions, along with the 
government‘s support of the courts‘ analysis and holdings, domestic 
workers have a good chance of surviving the motion to dismiss if they 
file their complaint after their diplomat-employer is no longer an 
accredited diplomat in the United States. If the diplomat is still 
serving as a diplomat in another country, the domestic worker who 
experienced the harm in the U.S. can still seek justice in U.S. federal 
court because the diplomat‘s term in the U.S. is over, and therefore he 
enjoys only residual immunity. If victims can escape and wait until 
the diplomat is no longer acting in his capacity as a diplomat in the 
U.S., those who can show that their employers abused, exploited, or 
trafficked them can legally stay in the U.S. under certain 
accommodations and visas.
173
 These procedures allow the victims to 
remain in the U.S. and file suit under the residual-immunity theory, 
even years after they stop working for the diplomat. However, the 
waiting period that results from bringing the claims under residual 
immunity imposes incredible burdens on the victims who likely do 
not have family or friends in the U.S., a place to live, or money to live 
on because they never received wages. The victims may be unable to 
remain in the U.S. until they can file suit because of these emotional, 
financial, and practical constraints. As a result, victims may never 
obtain justice. Therefore, it is necessary to provide other avenues of 
relief to these human-trafficking victims within the U.S. 
C. Human-Trafficking Exception to Diplomatic Immunity  
Because residual immunity applies only after the diplomat ceases 
to serve as a diplomat in the U.S., a stronger and more comprehensive 
                                                                                                                 
172 Id.  
173 There are three main immigration accommodations available to victims. Under the 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(WWTVPRA), once an A-3 or G-5 visa holder files a complaint, the Department of Homeland 
Security may grant the alleged victim continued presence so that the victims can legally stay in 
the U.S. and work ―for time sufficient to fully and effectively participate in all legal proceedings 
related to such action.‖ Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(c)(1)(a), 122 Stat. 5044, 5058 (2008). The 
victim can also apply for either the T-visa or the U-visa. The T-visa is granted to victims of ―a 
severe form of trafficking in persons‖ who, because of trafficking, are physically present in the 
U.S. or at an American port of entry. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (2006). Victims are also able to apply for a U-visa, which is granted to 
persons who have ―suffered substantial physical or mental abuse‖ due to specified acts of 
violence, including involuntary servitude. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I).With the T-visa or the U-visa, 
the victim can work in the U.S., apply for government benefits such as food stamps and medical 
care, and after three years can file for adjustment of status to be a lawful permanent resident. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(U); GAO Report, supra note 9, at 10.  
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policy should be enacted and accepted to solve this problem. 
However, due to the international nature of the problem, and 
diplomatic immunity‘s status as a basic principle of universally 
accepted international law, federal courts or Congress cannot act 
unilaterally to create a human-trafficking exception to diplomatic 
immunity that would apply in U.S. courts. Nonetheless, the human-
trafficking exception to diplomatic immunity would fulfill the goals 
of bringing justice to those who have been treated as slaves on U.S. 
soil and reducing the likelihood that diplomats would continue 
engaging in this practice. The impact on U.S foreign relations of the 
United States unilaterally creating a human-trafficking exception, 
however, is too devastating to be a realistic option.  
One concern is the strain on American relations with other States 
because allowing diplomats to be sued in U.S. courts would be a clear 
violation of international law under the VCDR. As the government 
argued in Sabbithi, the ―privileges and immunities accorded to 
diplomats under the Vienna Convention are vital to the conduct of 
peaceful international relations and must be respected. If the United 
States is prevented from carrying out its international obligation to 
protect the immunities of foreign diplomats, adverse consequences 
may well obtain.‖174  
Another major concern is that a departure from the international 
consensus would hurt American diplomats abroad. The courts and the 
government explain, ―[r]ecent history is unfortunately replete with 
examples demonstrating how fragile is the security for American 
diplomats and personnel in foreign countries; their safety is a matter 
of real and continuing concern.‖175 The Tabion court elaborated that 
―[t]o protect United States diplomats from criminal and civil 
prosecution in foreign lands with differing cultural and legal norms as 
well as fluctuating political climates, the United States has bargained 
to offer that same protection to diplomats visiting this country.‖176 
The federal courts have realized that ―by upsetting existing treaty 
relationships American diplomats abroad may well be denied lawful 
protection of their lives and property to which they would otherwise 
be entitled.‖177  
                                                                                                                 
174 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 24–25. 
175 Id. at 25 (quoting 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Rep. of Zaire to 
the United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
176 Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 293 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 
1996). 
177 Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
23, 2002) (quoting 757 Third Ave. Assocs., 988 F.2d at 296). 
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Finally, the government is also concerned that other states would 
respond by subjecting American diplomats to controversial and 
possibly unwarranted litigation in foreign jurisdictions.
178
 Many 
courts have agreed and stated that ―[b]ecause not all countries provide 
the level of due process to which United States citizens have become 
accustomed, and because diplomats are particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation for political purposes, immunity for American diplomats 
abroad is essential.‖179 
The international community as a whole must take action to solve 
this problem and avoid the consequences of deviating from the global 
consensus for multiple reasons. First, domestic-worker trafficking by 
diplomats occurs around the world.
180
 Secondly, countries in addition 
to the U.S. likely have similar concerns about repercussions for their 
diplomats if they unilaterally take a harder stance against diplomats 
engaged in human trafficking inside their own residences. Thirdly, the 
international community broadly supports the eradication of human 
trafficking worldwide. For example, the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA)
181
 specifically provides that the ―United States 
and the international community agree that trafficking in persons 
involves grave violations of human rights and is a matter of pressing 
international concern‖ and cites twelve declarations, treaties, U.N. 
resolutions, and reports that condemn involuntary servitude, violence 
against women, and other components of trafficking in persons.
182
 
Additionally, Article 6(2) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
                                                                                                                 
178 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 21.  
179 Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 293.  
180 For example, the 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report noted that the ―trafficking of 
workers for domestic servitude and trafficking for sexual exploitation continued to be 
committed by some members of the international community posted in Belgium. The Belgian 
government has conducted campaigns to reduce this problem and investigate such cases.‖ U.S. 
DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 78 (2009), available at http://www.state. 
gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/123135.htm. Similar problems were reported in France.  Id. at 135. 
181 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006). 
182 Id. § 7101(b)(23) (explaining ―[t]he international community has repeatedly condemned 
slavery and involuntary servitude, violence against women, and other elements of trafficking, 
through declarations, treaties, and United Nations resolutions and reports, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition 
of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the 1948 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labor 
Convention; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 50/167, 51/66, and 52/98; the Final Report of the World 
Congress against Sexual Exploitation of Children (Stockholm, 1996); the Fourth World 
Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995); and the 1991 Moscow Document of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe‖). 
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Organized Crime obligates each State Party to ensure that its 
domestic legal or administrative system offers ―victims of trafficking 
in persons . . . (a) [i]nformation on relevant court and administrative 
proceedings; (b) [a]ssistance to enable their views and concerns to be 
presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal 
proceedings against offenders, in a manner not prejudicial to the 
rights of the defence.‖183 Each State Party must also ―ensure that its 
domestic legal system contains measures that offer victims of 
trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining compensation for 
damage suffered.‖184 However, because of diplomatic immunity, State 
Parties cannot carry out these obligations with respect to trafficking 
victims who are domestic workers of diplomats.  
An ideal option would be for the U.N. to adopt a human-
trafficking exception to the VCDR modeled after the commercial-
activities exception. Even though the VCDR does not provide for a 
method of amendment, State Parties do have the power to create a 
human-trafficking exception.
185
 The proposing party state could argue 
that human trafficking is similarly, or even more ―wholly inconsistent 
with the position of the diplomatic agent, and that one possible 
consequence of his engaging in them might be that he would be 
declared persona non grata.‖186 State Parties may also recognize the 
injustice of ―a diplomatic agent, ignoring the restraints which his 
status ought to have imposed upon him‖ forcing a human trafficking 
victim who worked for the diplomatic agent ―to go abroad in order to 
have the case settled by a foreign court.‖187 In addition, State Parties 
might be inclined to accept this exception if their own ―diplomatic 
officers are forbidden to engage in such activities in the country of 
their assignment, [and] other states have not all been so inclined to 
restrict the activities of their diplomatic agents.‖188 The wording 
would have to be very limited in scope for the amendment to even be 
considered, but a State Party could propose language reflective of the 
phrasing of the commercial-activities exception. One possible 
                                                                                                                 
183 G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 at Annex II, Art. 6(2) (Jan. 8, 
2001). 
184 Id. at Annex II, art. 6(6).  
185 DENZA, supra note 21, at 7. 
186 Gov‘t Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48 at 11 (quoting Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 98, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1);Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 290 (E.D.Va. 1995), 
aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting same). 
187 Gov't Statement, Sabbithi, supra note 48, at 10 (quoting Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities: Summary of 
Observations Received from Governments and Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur, Int‘l Law 
Comm‘n, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/116 (May 2, 1958) (by A. Emil F. Sandström)).  
188 Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WHITEMAN, supra note 56, at 406). 
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wording for the human-trafficking could be: ―a diplomatic agent is 
not immune from suit arising from actions relating to human 
trafficking inside the sending State‘s mission or inside the diplomat‘s 
residence.‖  
The key question, of course, is whether there will be the requisite 
political will to take such a bold move. As noted above, there is 
strong international and national support for combating human 
trafficking,
189
 but the difficulty of passing any amendment to the 
VCDR remains a major issue. The VCDR has remained unamended 
because governments continue to favor protecting their diplomats and 
missions from ―terrorism, mob violence, and intrusive harassment 
from unfriendly States‖ over combating abuse via an amendment.190 
Instead, governments have decided to ―use the remedies already 
provided in the Convention more vigorously even where this carried 
short-term political disadvantages, to invoke countermeasures on a 
basis of reciprocity, and to build up coalitions to apply pressure on 
States flouting normal rules of international conduct.‖191 Therefore, it 
is more likely that governments will choose to use existing tools in 
the VCDR, such as declaring an abusive diplomat persona non grata, 
than to agree upon a human trafficking exception to the VCDR. 
However, given the gravity of the problem and the international push 
towards the fight against human trafficking, it is possible that State 
Parties may now consider a limited human-trafficking exception to 
diplomatic immunity.  
Even if the international community would craft a human-
trafficking exception in the Vienna Convention or if a domestic 
worker prevails against her diplomat employer in court under residual 
immunity, the problem still remains that litigants themselves are 
unable to obtain meaningful relief because diplomats are typically 
judgment-proof. First, the domestic worker will likely be unable to 
find any property or bank accounts of the former diplomat within the 
court‘s jurisdiction for her to attach because the diplomat most likely 
closed any U.S. bank accounts and took all his property out of the 
U.S. upon leaving the country. Secondly, the domestic worker will 
                                                                                                                 
189 See supra notes 181–84.  
190 DENZA, supra note 21, at 7.  
191 Id. at 7–8. After the 1984 shooting at the Libyan People‘ Bureau in London, the House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) drafted a report on the abuse of diplomatic 
immunities. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES AND 
PRIVILEGES, 1984–85, H.C. 127 (U.K.) [hereinafter FAC REPORT]. The FAC addressed the 
possibility of amending the VCDR to include limitations on ―immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction of accredited diplomats‖ and ―personal immunity after participation in acts of 
terrorism,‖ but decided against recommending an amendment because the practical difficulties 
of getting it passed and fear of reciprocity. Id. ¶¶ 53–57.  
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not be able to place a levy on the mission or embassy because the 
judgment indicates that the diplomat was acting outside of his official 
functions in the misconduct, and therefore was no longer acting on 
behalf of the State.  
One possible solution to this problem is to require diplomats to 
post a bond before the household worker‘s visa is approved. 
Therefore, if the household worker sues the diplomat, she will be able 
to attach the bond and, if she wins, she will at least be able to recover 
the value of the bond. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. would, in 
practice, require diplomats, especially those with a clean record, to 
post a bond because of the fear of reciprocity and tarnishing relations 
with the diplomat and her sending State. Therefore, a domestic 
worker most likely will never be compensated for the money she 
earned during her employment.   
However, the fact that a domestic worker is unable to collect her 
judgment does not detract from the deterrent value of winning a 
favorable judgment. Even if the plaintiff cannot be made whole, 
another goal of a judgment against the diplomat is to prevent these 
atrocities from happening in the future. Once the government or the 
international organization is aware of diplomats who have been 
reported or convicted of abusing household workers, they can prevent 
those diplomats from being granted future A-3 and G-5 visas. Part III 
will also propose other available deterrent measures that the 
government and international organizations can and should adopt. 
The following solutions are forward-looking and aimed towards the 
goals of deterring diplomats from abusing their domestic workers in 
the future.  
III. IMMIGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES  
A. Improve Visa Issuance and Implementation Procedures at 
Embassies and Consulates 
The United States, as a partial solution to the problem, could 
reduce the likelihood that domestic workers even begin working for 
an abusive diplomat by improving visa issuance procedures and 
implementing these procedures at U.S. embassies and consulates 
overseas. Domestic-worker employees of officials who work for 
foreign embassies, consulates, and governments are eligible for an A-
3 visa, and domestic workers of staff members of international 
organizations, such as the U.N. or the World Bank, are eligible for a 
G-5 visa. Between 2000 and 2007, American embassies and 
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consulates overseas granted 7,522 G-5 visas and 10,386 A-3 visas.
192
 
The State Department‘s Foreign Affairs Manual requires that Foreign 
Service officers follow a certain process and ensure that certain 
criteria are met before approving A-3 and G-5 employment 
contracts.
193
 Most of the measures are designed to prevent domestic 
workers from obtaining visas to come to the U.S. under circumstances 
that a consular officer finds suspicious. To obtain an A-3 or G-5 visa, 
the applicant must submit: an employment contract signed by both the 
employer and the employee containing an agreement that the 
employer will abide by all federal, state, and local laws; a guarantee 
that the employer will pay the greater of either the minimum wage or 
the prevailing wage; details on the frequency and form of payment, 
work duties, weekly work hours, holidays, sick days, and vacation 
days; an employee statement that she will not work elsewhere; an 
employer statement that he will not withhold the passport; 
employment contract, or other personal property of the employee; and 
a statement that both the employer and employee understand that the 
employee can remain on the premises after hours only if 
compensated.
194
 In addition, the applicant must submit the contract in 
English and in a language that the applicant comprehends to help 
ensure that the applicant understands his or her rights and duties.
195
  
Even though these policies are in place, they are not always 
executed effectively. Based on visits to four consular posts, the July 
2008 GAO Report found that some consular officers were unfamiliar 
with or uncertain about certain aspects of guidance on the issuance of 
A-3 and G-5 visas.
196
 For example, the GAO found that many officers 
did not realize that a diplomatic note from the diplomat‘s embassy or 
mission confirming the employer‘s diplomatic status was required to 
process the application,
197
 or that they were supposed to electronically 
scan the employment contracts into the Consular Affairs Consolidated 
Database.
198
 Additionally, the GAO discovered that many of the 
contracts did not contain all of the necessary criteria. For instance, 
71% of the contracts at one post, 35% at the second, 23% at the third, 
and 6% at the fourth did not contain at least one of the necessary 
criteria.
199
 Some contracts had multiple deficiencies. One contract, for 
example, paid the employee below the minimum wage and omitted 
                                                                                                                 
192 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 7.  
193 9 U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, Foreign Affairs Manual 41.21 N6.2 (2009) [hereinafter FAM]. 
194 Id. 
195 Id.  
196 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 22. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 23.  
199 Id. at 21. 
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the section providing that the employer could not require the 
employee to stay on the premises after working hours without pay.
200
 
Additionally, at a post in a country where residents rarely spoke or 
read English, the GAO found that all of the contracts were written 
only in English, though it is required that the contract be translated 
into the language familiar to the applicant as well.
201
 
There were also deficiencies in the information that many officers 
gave applicants. The officers were unaware, and therefore did not 
inform applicants, of the telephone hotline for reporting abuse and of 
the State Department‘s advice to call 911 in case of an emergency or 
for help. Nor did they give applicants the anti-trafficking brochere 
recommended by the State Department.
202
 The GAO explained the 
importance of these educational measures by sharing the words of 
workers who reported abuse. One worker recommended that 
American embassies should inform A-3 and G-5 visa applicants of 
their rights and provide contact information for resources that to 
which victims can turn. She explained that the employers often 
continue the abuse by telling the workers that they are not protected 
by U.S. law, but rather are subject to the laws of the diplomat‘s 
state.
203
 Another abuse victim stated that she knew to seek help 




The government responded to this inconsistency in information 
dissemination by requiring, under the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(WWTVPRA),
205
 that the consular officer inform the applicant of his 
or her legal rights under federal immigration, labor, and employment 
laws, including explaining the ―illegality of slavery, peonage, 
trafficking in persons, sexual assault, extortion, blackmail, and 
worker exploitation‖206 during the visa interview. WWTVPRA also 
requires that consular officers give applicants a pamphlet
207
 that 
explains the workers‘ legal rights and answers important questions 
such as ―what should I do if my rights are violated?‖ and ―will I be 
                                                                                                                 
200 Id.  
201 Id. at 21–22.  
202 Id. at 22–23. Under the WWTVPRA, it is now required that consular officers give a 
pamphlet similar to the pamphlet that the GAO recommended. See supra note 173. 
203 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 23. 
204 Id.  
205 Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).  
206 Id. § 202(b)(3); FAM, supra note 193, at 41.21 N6.5-1.  
207 Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 202, 122 Stat. 5055; U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, WWTVPRA 
PAMPHLET (2009), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/Pamphlet-Order.pdf [hereinafter 
WVTVPRA PAMPHLET]; FAM, supra note 193, at N6.5-2 (Consular Officer Responsibilities).  
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deported if I report the abuse?‖ The pamphlet encourages workers to 
get help if their rights are violated and provides the telephone 
numbers for the National Human Trafficking Resource Center‘s 24-
hour hotline (a non-governmental organization), the Trafficking in 
Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force Complaint Line (run by 
the Department of Justice), and 911.
208
  
Since consulate officers are unaware or uncertain of many policies 
essential to combating the domestic-worker trafficking, the 
WWTVPRA now requires the State Department to provide training to 
consular officers on fair labor standards, human trafficking, changes 
resulting from the WWTVPRA, and information in the pamphlet that 
consular officers are required to give and review with the applicant.
209
 
In addition, the State Department can require a consular officer to fill 
out and attach a checklist of all the requirements to the applicant‘s 
file. The checklist is a quick and easy way to ensure that all the 
requirements are known and met, thereby reducing the number of 
dodgy A-3 and G-5 visas granted.  
The State Department has taken some action to address the 
confusion over when consular officers may and must deny A-3 and 
G-5 visas, but more needs to be done. The GAO found that many 
consular officers were unsure of the circumstances under which they 
could refuse to grant the visas because the Foreign Affairs Manual 
did not explicitly provide that officers may deny applications if they 
were concerned about abuse or mistreatment.
210
 Therefore, many 
officers reported that they often felt compelled to approve a visa 
application, even if it was suspicious, so long as there was a valid 
employment contract.
211
 Congress solved part of the problem by 
requiring the Secretary of State to suspend the issuance of A-3 or G-5 
visas if ―the Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1 
or more employees of such mission or international organization have 
abused or exploited 1 or more nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or 
a G-5 visa, and that the diplomatic mission or international 
organization tolerated such actions.‖212 The State Department will 
                                                                                                                 
208 WWTVPRA PAMPHLET, supra note 207; FAM, supra note 193, at N6.5-1 (Contents of 
Information Packet).  
209 Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(b)(3), 122 Stat. 5055 The State Department issued a 
telegram to all diplomatic and consular posts explaining the changes of the WWTVPRA. 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, U.S. DEP‘T OF 
STATE (June, 2009), http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_4542.html. 
210 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 24.  
211 Id. at 25.  
212 Pub. L. No. 110-457, §203(a)(3), 122 Stat. 5055, reflected in FAM, supra note 193, at 
N6.6, (―Suspension of Processing of A-3 and G-5 Applications from Certain Foreign Missions 
and International Organizations‖).  
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then notify all visa processing posts of the suspension so that no A-3 
or G-5 visas are issued.
213
  
The State Department can base its decision to suspend the issuance 
of the visas from two major sources of information that Congress 
requires the executive branch to maintain. First, Congress requires the 
Secretary of State to maintain records of each A-3 and G-5 visa-
holder‘s date of entrance and permanent exit; the official title, contact 
information, and immunity of the employer; and any information 
about any allegations of employer abuse received by the State 
Department.
214
 Secondly, by December 2010, the federal departments 
must combine all relevant information collected by each department 
or agency in the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking into an ―integrated database‖ within the Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center.
215
  
Though these provisions are important additions and will be useful 
in stopping the recurrence of the problem by repeat offenders, the 
Foreign Affairs Manual still fails to provide concrete circumstances 
in which a consular officer may or must refuse to grant the visa. The 
State Department explained that ―officers have little to go on beyond 
the contract and [that] it is impossible to refuse a visa based on 
something that has not happened or will not happen for another 6 
months.‖216 However, there still may be signs that mistreatment is 
likely, and the State Department should clarify that consular officers 
have the discretion to deny visas in suspicious circumstances. 
Consular officials at State Department headquarters told the GAO that 
―it is appropriate and even expected for consular officers to refuse A-
3 and G-5 visas if they believe that visa applicants may be abused by 
their prospective employers.‖217 But since that expectation is not 
expressed in the Foreign Affairs Manual, and no examples are 
provided, consular officers may still feel compelled to grant the visa 
if all of the technical requirements are met. The State Department 
may consider adding that consular officers may deny a visa if the 
applicant is under eighteen, if the employer resisted the private 
interview between the applicant and the consular officer, or if the 
applicant had not yet met the employer.
218
 
                                                                                                                 
213 FAM, supra note 193, at N6.6. 
214 Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 203(b)(4), 122 Stat. 5055.  
215 Id. § 108(a), 122 Stat. 5021.  
216 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
217 Id.  
218 These are circumstances under which consular officers have denied, or wanted to deny, 
A-3 and G-5 visas in the past. GAO Report, supra note 9, at 24–25.  
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B. Continuing Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa-holders 
Even if consular officers follow all the procedures perfectly, 
diplomats may still decide to ignore the employment contracts and 
abuse the domestic workers. To combat diplomats disregarding the 
terms of the contract, Congress should consider requiring A-3 and G-
5 visa-holders to meet with a United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) officer three months after their arrival 
in the U.S. The purpose of the meeting would be to give the visa-
holder a guaranteed opportunity to reveal any problems or abuse to 
the USCIS officer and allow the USCIS officer to remind the 
domestic worker of the resources available to them if they are later 
abused. If the visa-holder does not show up or reports abuse, USCIS 
should have the authority to investigate the situation. If the diplomat 
resists the investigation or the investigation supports the abuse 
allegations, USCIS should be able revoke the A-3 or G-5 visa and 
change the domestic worker‘s visa classification to a T-visa or a U-
visa, which would allow the victim to remain in the U.S., find work, 
apply for food stamps and medical care, and after three years file for 
adjustment of status to be a lawful permanent resident.
219
 This policy 
would help victims get out of the abusive environment, identify 
abusive diplomats, and prevent abusive diplomats from obtaining A-3 
and G-5 visas in the future.  
Additionally, international organizations can take control of the 
problem by establishing effective procedures for conducting internal 
review and providing institutional methods of relief. The IMF and 





 revealed that the IMF and World Bank 
officials were ―some of the worst offenders‖ of household worker 
abuse and that both ―take a hands-off approach once the workers are 
here.‖222 Subsequently, the IMF and World Bank have sought to 
improve their efforts to prevent, investigate, and stop abuse of 
household workers.
223
 The World Bank created a model internal 
review system that establishes appropriate oversight for the 
employment of G-5 household workers. It also created a Code of 
Conduct Regarding Employment of G-5 Domestic Employees,
224
 
                                                                                                                 
219 Id. at 10, 24–25. 
220 William Branigin, A Life of Exhaustion, Beatings, and Isolation, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 
1999, at A6.  
221 Editorial, Not in This Country, They Can’t, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1999, at A24. 
222 Id.  
223 Michel Camdessus & James D. Wolfensohn, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 
1999, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/1999/011699.htm. 
224 F00042 World Bank Group Code of Conduct Regarding Employment of G5 Domestic 
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which obligates each staff member to comply with the provisions of 
federal, state, and local law related to the employment of G-5 
domestic employees and provides that violations may result in 
disciplinary action, such as loss in the privilege of employing a G-5 
employee and dismissal.
225
 The Code offers specific examples 
regarding what is to be included in the employment contract, such as 
the requirement that the contract must contain a complaint procedure 
that enables the G-5 employee to make a complaint regarding his or 
her fair treatment to the World Bank‘s Office of Professional Ethics 
or with the Human Resources Department.
226
 The World Bank also 
requires that the staff member and the G-5 employee attend an 
orientation program together explaining their mutual rights and 
responsibilities soon after their arrival in the U.S.; if they both do not 
attend the orientation, the World Bank may withhold any visa 
services for the staff member.
227
 Additionally, the World Bank 
requires the staff member to maintain specific records of the G-5 
employee‘s position for the entire period of employment and for a 
minimum of three calendar years after the G-5 employee‘s 
termination.
228
 These records are subject to periodic audit or audit in 
response to a complaint.
229
  
Although these procedures are in place, the practical effects of the 
measures vary. Some workers have complained that they experienced 
―months-long delays [after filing a complaint] and hostility when they 
finally meet with World Bank officials.‖230 Moreover, these 
procedures may be helpful for those household workers who wish to 
remain employed by the World Bank staff member, but those who 
wish to be made whole through damages have no relief under the 
process.  
                                                                                                                 
 
Employees, THE WORLD BANK (2009), http://go.worldbank.org/5T74JMNEB0 [hereinafter 
World Bank Code of Conduct].  
225 Id. at 1.  
226 Id. at 3.  
227 Id.  
228 Id. For example, the staff member must keep a copy of the employment contract and 
any amendments, proof of wage payments, derivation of deductions taken from gross wages 
each pay period, a dated contemporaneous timesheet signed and dated by both the staff member 
and the G-5 employee at least on a weekly basis, copies of any health insurance policy and 
proof of payment by the staff member for insurance premiums, and various other documents. Id. 
at 3–4. 
229 Id. at 4.  
230 Krista Friedrich, Note, Statutes of Liberty? Seeking Justice Under United States Law 
When Diplomats Traffic in Persons, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1139, 1164, (2007) (quoting Lora Jo 
Foo, The Trafficking of Asian Women, in ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND 
RESPONSIVE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 47, 51 (2002)).  
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A household worker could theoretically file a complaint with the 
World Bank and the World Bank could threaten or use disciplinary 
action to resolve the problem. The World Bank stipulates, ―the staff 
member may not interfere with such complaints or retaliate against 
the G5 domestic employee for any good faith statement or action by 
or on behalf of the employee in connection with a complaint.‖231 
However, there remains no relief for domestic workers who want to 
stop working for the diplomat and obtain their unpaid salaries. The 
harshest punishment that the World Bank can give is dismissal, but 
the staff member‘s dismissal will not lead to the domestic worker 
regaining lost wages.  
IV. DIPLOMATIC PROCESS 
The government can also work through the diplomatic process to 
pursue allegations of abuse and ensure compliance with U.S. law. 
Informally, the State Department can try to intercede and help the 
parties resolve the problem outside of court. The government asserts 
that simply calling attention to the diplomat‘s misdeeds sometimes 
results in adequately embarrassing the diplomat, thereby inducing him 
to voluntarily comply with the law.
232
 The State Department can also 
request that the sending State waive the diplomat‘s immunity,233 but it 
is unlikely that the sending State would abandon its representative 
and risk the embarrassment of a trial exposing the wrongdoings of the 
diplomat, which would reflect badly on the sending State. For 
example, in Sabbithi, Kuwait refused the State Department‘s request 
to waive the diplomat‘s immunity and the Department of Justice 
therefore had to end its investigation of the household-worker‘s 
allegations.
234
 The State Department also has the discretion to refuse 
to accept future diplomats from a country that it views as assisting or 
approving illegal conduct.
235
 Furthermore, the U.S. can stop or 
decrease economic or developmental aid to a country if it allows its 
diplomats to continue in a pattern of breaking American laws in hopes 




                                                                                                                 
231 World Bank Code of Conduct, supra note 224, at 3.  
232 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 10. 
233 ―The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents . . . may be waived by the 
sending State. Waiver must always be express.‖ VCDR, supra note 19, art 32(1)–(2).  
234 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 125 (D.D.C 2009). 
235 See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 293 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 
(4th Cir. 1996) (citing The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act: Hearings on H.R. 3036 
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 50 (1988)). 
236 Id.  
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Another formal measure that the State Department can take is to 
declare the diplomat persona non grata under Article 9(1) of the 
VCDR. If this happens, the sending State must either recall the 
diplomat or terminate his functions, or else the U.S. can expel him.
237
 
As diplomatic-law expert Eileen Denza explains, ―Article 9 has 
proved in practice to be a key provision which enables the receiving 
State to protect itself against numerous forms of unacceptable activity 
by members of diplomatic missions and forms an important 
counterweight to the immunities conferred elsewhere in the 
Convention.‖238 For example, the United Kingdom successfully used 
persona non grata to dramatically decrease the number of diplomats 
who deliberately and systematically refused to pay their parking 
tickets. The diplomatic corps in London ―reluctantly‖ accepted this 
action—even though this use of persona non grata was 
unprecedented—because it was within the powers of the receiving 
State.
239
 The United Kingdom has also adopted a policy of declaring 
diplomats persona non grata when they engage in espionage, 
incitement or advocacy of violence, violent crime, drug trafficking, 
firearms offenses, rape, fraud, multiple drunk driving offenses, traffic 
offenses involving serious death or injury, driving without third-party 
insurance, theft (including large-scale shoplifting), and even multiple 
lesser-scale shoplifting offenses.
240
 Additionally, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden have declared diplomatic agents persona non 
grata for crimes such as drug trafficking and the illegal importation 
and sale of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes.
241
  
While the U.S. has not been as liberal as the United Kingdom in 
using Article 9, it will declare a person persona non grata for the 
possession or carrying of unauthorized firearms.
242
 Even though using 
Article 9 would be an effective and internationally acceptable solution 
to the problem, the U.S. has stated its reluctance in the past for using 
persona non grata because it is concerned about unjustified 
reciprocity of its use and tarnishing the ―United States‘ reputation for 
being a society governed by the rule of law.‖243  
Though the fear of reciprocity should be considered, the 
government should not be ―excessively reluctant‖ to declare a 
                                                                                                                 
237 VCDR, supra note 19, art. 9(1); Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 293.  
238 DENZA, supra note 21, at 76–77. 
239 Id. at 86.  
240 Id. at 83.  
241 Id. at 84.  
242 Id. at 85–86.  
243 Id. at 85 (quoting Department of State Guidance for Law Enforcement Officers with 
regard to Personal Rights and Immunities of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Personnel, 
printed in Feb. 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1617, 1633).  
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diplomat persona non grata because ―[o]therwise, [the government] 
will effectively have conceded the real powers that are available 
under the convention to control abuses. The protection against abuse 
of diplomatic immunity requires not only well-drawn clauses in a 
treaty: it also requires political will.‖
 244
 Many leaders in Washington 
recently pledged to fight human-trafficking crimes committed by 
diplomats.
245
 This, coupled with the unanimous passage of the 
WWTVPRA in 2008, signals that the U.S. may be more willing to 
take bolder legislative or diplomatic action.  
Just as the U.S. holds the rule of law as a bedrock of American 
society, the right to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude is 
also fundamental.
246
 Therefore, the U.S. should not allow the 
enslavement and abuse of domestic workers by foreign diplomats in 
the U.S. to taint America‘s image as a society dedicated to the 
unalienable right of freedom for all. The U.S. can promote both the 
image of a society governed by the rule of law and the unalienable 
right of freedom for all by adopting a policy of declaring a diplomat 
persona non grata for human-trafficking offenses, similar to its 
policy regarding firearms offenses. International precedent for taking 
bolder action in declaring a diplomat persona non grata for drug 
trafficking offenses is already established by the actions by the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway, so it is not a far 
stretch to adopt a similar policy for human trafficking. Though this is 
only a partial solution (because the victim is not able to recover any 
damages for the abuse), at least the abusive diplomat is expelled from 
the country and hopefully prevented from obtaining an A-3 or G-5 
visa in the future.  
                                                                                                                 
244 FAC REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 66.  
245 Luis CdeBaca, the Ambassador At-large for Human Trafficking, stated, ―immunity 
does not mean impunity to enslave domestic servants on U.S. soil, and we will continue to work 
to ensure that these domestic workers are accorded full rights and human dignity in our 
country.‖ Fitzpatrick, supra note 14. See also supra text accompanying note 1. Senator Richard 
Durbin of Illinois, Chairman of a Senate Subcommittee on Human Rights, has been quoted as 
saying: ―It‘s unthinkable that we would let this continue.‖ Kirk Semple, Government Report 
Points to Diplomats’ Abuse of Workers They Bring With Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at 
B3. 
246 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(22) 
(2006) (―One of the founding documents of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, 
recognizes an inherent dignity and worth of all people. It states that all men are created equal 
and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. The right to be free 
from slavery and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable rights. Acknowledging this 
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women and children are similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was 
founded.‖). 
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CONCLUSION 
The stories of courageous women escaping their captivity and 
seeking help have opened the public and the government‘s eyes to the 
reality of trafficking and exploitation by foreign-diplomat employers. 
The legal and political battle of bringing these abusive diplomats to 
justice has begun, but there is still much to be accomplished. 
Although litigants have recently experienced more success in 
obtaining judgments against their diplomat employers under a theory 
of residual immunity, judicial avenues of relief are far from adequate. 
Not only do the household workers have to wait until the diplomat‘s 
term is over before they can bring suit, even if the litigation is 
successful, they will likely never be able to collect on the judgment. 
However, litigation and formal complaints to international 
organizations are extremely important in raising awareness of specific 
offenders. Once the government and organizational authorities are 
aware of who is involved in the violations, they can prohibit the 
perpetrators from bringing over household workers in the future.  
Since the most impact will come from forward-looking solutions, 
it is necessary to be aware of tools within the government‘s reach. 
Legislation is a key tool in combating the abuse. The passage of the 
William Wilburforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act was a big step forward. Through this law, Congress tightened the 
visa interview process and forced consular officers to explain and 
give applicants a copy of a pamphlet outlining their legal rights and 
ways to get help. However, Congress needs to pass more legislation 
requiring the government to routinely check-up on domestic workers 
to make sure that they are not stuck in abusive situations. With 
increased public awareness and the pledges of Senator Richard 
Durbin, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Ambassador 
Luis CdeBaca to combat trafficking,
247
 it is possible that more 
legislation on this topic will be passed.  
Nonetheless, because of the fear of reciprocity, it is unlikely that 
the U.S. government or the international community will pass any 
legislation or make any amendments to the VCDR that would make 
even a small dent in the absolute nature of diplomatic immunity. 
However, the U.S. can and should use the diplomatic process and the 
formal measures embodied in the VCDR, such as declaring a 
diplomat persona non grata, to combat this problem. The U.S. should 
follow the lead of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden in expanding the use of persona non grata to include 
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more crimes and be the first country to declare a diplomat persona 
non grata for trafficking domestic workers. Therefore, even though 
under the current legal framework it is unlikely that the courts or the 
government can remedy the abuse that has happened in the past, 
authorities may be able to diminish, if not eliminate, similar abuse 
from occurring in the future. Action needs to be taken, for indeed, 





                                                                                                                 
248 Semple, supra note 245 (quoting Senator Richard Durbin) (internal quotation marks 
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